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ABSTRACT
After the large-scale creation of arm’s length agencies by gov-
ernments around the globe, these governments now face the
dilemma of how to manage, steer or control these arm’s
length agencies. Different instruments have been developed,
based on either of two theoretical models: principal-agent
theory or stewardship theory. Both are based on economic
models of man with a principal charging an agent or a stew-
ard with a task. Principal-agent theory is based on the princi-
pal distrusting the agent to perform as agreed, leading to a
need for extra monitoring and control. Stewardship theory is
based on trust, and requires very different instruments to
manage at arm’s length. Using the perspective of arm’s length
bodies at federal level in Australia, we will describe how they
perceive the instruments that have been implemented by
their portfolio departments to manage and control them.
Using survey data (N¼ 89), we will test which of the two
models is used most often in this country, one of the front-
runners in agencification. Results show that arm’s length agen-
cies are more inclined to take a stewardship position, while a
mixture of instruments from the principal-agent and steward-







One of the reforms that became known under the heading of New Public
Management is the structural disaggregation of units of the government
bureaucracy, for example ministerial directorates, turning them into semi-
autonomous bodies or arm’s length agencies (Hood, 1991). While this kind
of agency creation, or agencification, was not a new development, it
became a very popular way from the 1980s on in many western countries
to slim down the government and put policy implementation at arm’s
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length (Pollitt et al., 2004; Verhoest et al., 2012). Consequently, different
legal types of arm’s length agencies (ALAs) continued in prominence or
growth, or were subject to managerial changes, in the 1980s and 1990s,
also in Australia (Aulich & Wettenhall, 2012). ALAs are known under vari-
ous labels, for example in Australia statutory authorities, in New Zealand
Crown Entities, in the UK Non-Departmental Public Bodies and Next
Steps Agencies, in the Netherlands ZBOs, and in Southern-European coun-
tries public establishments
ALAs were granted legal independence and managerial autonomy, in the
expectation that they would operate more business-like and achieve more
efficiency (Overman, 2016). However, agencification also created a new
governance dilemma: as ALAs by definition involve devolved authority,
and are generally interpreted not to be hierarchically subordinate to the
government bureaucracy, how can governments monitor and control them
to make sure that they carry out their task as intended? To this end, gov-
ernments can and do make use of a variety of instruments for control and
monitoring, some of which have been newly developed to deal with the
nonhierarchical nature of the relationship.
The relationship between governments and ALAs is predominantly mod-
eled on the principles of principal-agent theory (James & Van Thiel, 2011).
We will explain this theory in more detail below, but the main message for
this introduction is that it is based on goal divergence: the agent (ALA)
may serve its own goals rather than those of the principal. Based on this
premise, the government will prefer a very strict regime of control and
monitoring using instruments like accountability requirements, detailed
contracts and few degrees of freedom. More recently, an alternative model
has been proposed – the stewardship model – that departs from an
assumption of goal congruence: the interests of principals (government)
and stewards (ALAs) are aligned (Schillemans, 2013; based on Davis,
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; see also Bjurstrøm, 2020). As a result,
managing ALAs becomes more a matter of trust, results orientation and
indirect monitoring rather than direct intervention and control.
Empirically, we know very little about how ALAs are managed. Some
case studies have been done, but for a limited number of countries
(Flinders & Tonkiss, 2016 on the UK; Bertelli, 2006a, 2006b, Schillemans &
Bjurstrøm, 2020 and Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011 on the Netherlands; Van
Thiel and Pollitt, 2007, on the Netherlands and UK: and Verhoest et al.,
2010, on Ireland, Flanders and Norway; Bjurstøm, 2020 on Norway). In
this paper, we aim to investigate how Australian ALAs at the federal level
experience and perceive the way in which they are managed by the govern-
ment. Australia is an interesting case for two reasons. First, ALAs remain a
significant organizational form in Australia with recent recalibrations in
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types of ALAs and their governance. Second, Australia has a strong track
record in devolving management authority, including to ALAs (see more
below, Mulgan, 2002; Smullen, 2010, 2014; Smullen & Clutton, 2021;
Wettenhall, 2005;). Lessons can therefore be learned from the Australian
experience, both for academia and practice.
Next, we will describe the two models for management at arm’s length,
identifying which and what kind of instruments fit with the two
approaches. Then we will introduce the Australian case and test which
instruments and hence which model is in use, and how the ALAs perceive
this. For the analyses we make use of data from a survey that was held
among ALAs at the federal level from November to December 2017
(Smullen & Fawcett, 2018; Schillemans et al., 2020). The method section
describes the survey, data and method of analysis. After presenting and dis-
cussing the results, we will draw conclusions and offer some suggestions
for future research.
Management at arm’s length
In this section we will first go into the two models for the relationship
between ALAs and governments and the type of instruments that fit within
these models. This will lead to a number of expectations about the use of
the models and instruments.
Two models for arm’s length management
Principal agent theory is part of the neo-institutional economics (Besley,
2006; Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991). Originally, it
was used to model the relationship between shareholders and CEOs of a
company. In Public Administration the model is interpreted slightly differ-
ently (Miller, 2005): it portrays a dyadic relationship between a political
principal (here: minister or portfolio department) and an agent (here: arm’s
length agency). The principal pays the agent to carry out a specific task.
The model assumes both actors to act rationally i.e. in their self-interest.
As principals and agents may have different interests (goal divergence),
there is a potential conflict. This is facilitated by the information asym-
metry: the agent is the expert and has much more information about what
the task involves and what is needed to carry it out. The principal therefore
runs the risk to agree to disadvantageous conditions when hiring the agent
(adverse selection) such as paying too high prices, or the risk that the agent
can shirk in carrying out its task (moral hazard). To compensate for the
lack of information and to avoid these risks, the principal will choose to
monitor and control the agent, for example through accountability
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requirements, evaluations, audits, and so on. However, monitoring is costly,
adding onto the costs of hiring the agent.
The application of principal-agent theory onto the relationship between
political principals and ALAs is not without criticism (see Van Thiel, 2016,
for an overview). One of the most important points of critique concerns
the assumption of goal divergence (see e.g. Albanese et al., 1997; Arthurs &
Busenitz, 2003; Dicke, 2002). The critics argue that goal divergence does
not always have to occur. Particularly in the public domain policy makers
and policy implementers can be expected to have shared goals: that of mak-
ing and implementing good, effective policies and thus contribute to soci-
etal values. This line of critique has led several scholars (see e.g.
Schillemans, 2013; Van Thiel et al., 2018) to turn to a different economic
model for the relationship between political principals and ALAs: steward-
ship theory.
Stewardship theory incorporates elements from psychology into the
model (Davis et al., 1997). It also assumes a dyadic relationship, but now
between a (political) principal and a steward (agency). All actors are still
assumed to be rational, but there is no goal divergence. The interests of the
principal and the steward are aligned, focusing on the best organizational
result. Risks like adverse selection and moral hazard are therefore absent,
even though there is still an information asymmetry between the two par-
ties. Important to note, however, is that a steward is intrinsically motivated
and will not respond positively to hierarchical monitoring by the principal,
as that will be perceived as distrust. Therefore, other instruments are
needed to manage the steward and ensure its good performance.
When Davis et al. (1997) presented stewardship theory as an alternative
for principal-agent theory, they stated that the optimal situation is if both
actors choose the same model for their relationship. If the principal and
the agency each choose a different model, this will lead to suboptimal
results and dysfunctional relationships. However, several authors have ques-
tioned whether this claim holds, both on theoretical grounds (see e.g.
Pastoriza & Arino, 2011) and through limited empirical testing (see e.g.
Van Slyke, 2006; Dicke, 2002). Some of these authors have proposed
that instead of a dichotomy there is a continuum, ranging from a princi-
pal-agent approach to a stewardship approach. Governments can choose a
position on this continuum and change it over time or depending on the
situational conditions (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003; Pastoriza & Arino, 2011).
It is however not clear yet how this continuum would work (cf. Grundei,
2008); do principals start out in a principal-agent modus, which could over
time become a stewardship-like relationship, or do principals mix instru-
ments for autonomy and control from the start? Empirical research on the
use of the models is scarce but there are some first indications that show
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that governments use a mix of the two models (Schillemans & Bjurstrom,
2020; Van Thiel et al., 2018). This would contradict the dichotomous
nature of the models as emphasized by Davis et al. (1997, cf. Grundei,
2008) and, based on the prediction of Davis et al. (1997), could lead to dys-
functional relations. However, there is insufficient evidence to draw conclu-
sions just yet. More studies have to be done, and our study on Australian
federal ALAs aims to contribute to this goal. We will test which model and
instruments the federal government has put in place to manage ALAs, and
how this is perceived by the ALAs. In doing so, we deliberately place the
two models opposite of each other, to make for a clearer analysis.
Instruments for arm’s length management
If a principal-agent (PA) approach is used to manage ALAs we would
expect a preference for hierarchical instruments, based on the need to
monitor and check the agent. Therefore, in this approach ALAs will prob-
ably not be allowed to have an independent board. They will also not be
granted many degrees of freedom, financially and otherwise. Instead there
will be an intense regime of reporting, for example using multiple perform-
ance indicators, frequent contacts and detailed legislation. In a principal-
steward (PS) approach very different instruments will be used, based on a
trusting relationship. Management and control will be truly at arm’s length,
focused on outputs and results. ALAs will be granted autonomy to manage
themselves and their task. Contacts will be less frequent than in a PA
approach but not absent, and legislation will be less detailed (more frame-
work or principle based instead of rule based). Supervision/oversight may
be carried out by independent boards, regulators or inspectorates. The
Table below summarizes these two approaches and instruments (Table 1).
Below we will present findings on which instruments are in use in the
case of federal ALAs in Australia, and how they perceive this, for example
in terms of trust, the quality of interactions and goal convergence.
Together the results can be used to determine what type of relationship is
in use, at least according to the ALAs.
Arm’s length agencies in Australia
Australia is a (Westminster) parliamentary federation with a long tradition
of ALAs, particularly statutory authorities (Wettenhall, 2005; Weller, 2007;
Maley, 2017; Smullen & Clutton, 2021). Through the rise of New Public
Management in the 1980s and 1990s Australia saw both efforts for greater
assertion of political authority over administrative entities, together with
devolution of management responsibilities (see Aucoin 1990, 2012;
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Halligan, 2000; Smullen, 2010). This was characterized by more direct rela-
tionships between ministers and ALAs, greater formalization of manage-
ment responsibilities and the application of different kinds of financial,
management and structural instruments to oversee political-administrative
relationships, including those affecting arm’s length agencies. Most recently,
some of these initiatives specifically identify a stewardship role in legisla-
tion, with authority being dispersed based (at least rhetorically) on a princi-
ples (rather than detailed rule) approach to protect the strategic capability
of the public service (PSA 1999/2013; PGPA Act, 2013 (Canberra); see
Podger, 2016). Part of this vision included public servant stewardship of
civil society providers of public functions (PGPA, 2013; O’Flynn, 2019).
Types of semi-autonomous ALAs in Australia
Before setting out arm’s length agency types, or rather principal1 “entities”
in Australia’s recent reform parlance, it is important to clarify some ety-
mology, since the term “agency” in Australia is widely (and with a long his-
torical pedigree) used to describe a range of government entities, including
departments (Smullen, 2010). A standard departmental distinction drawn2
is that between the “central agencies” (Department of Prime Minister &
Cabinet; the Public Service Commission – which is a “Non Corporate
Commonwealth Entity” [NCCE, see definition below] within the portfolio
of Prime Minister & Cabinet, Treasury, and the Department of Finance),
Table 1. Instruments for management at arm’s length.
Instrument Principal agent (PA) Principal steward (PS)
Board  No board, or only a small
board and members




Monitoring/Accountability  High frequency of reporting,
audit, evaluation, etc.
 Focus on input
 No horizontal accountability
 Low frequency of reporting,
audit, evaluation, etc.
 Focus on output
and outcomes
 Horizontal accountability
Performance management  Part of monitoring: high
number of indicators,
imposed by principal, focus
on input
 Indicators report ex post
about results (output), ALA
involved in
developing indicators
Contacts  High frequency of contacts,
indicative of distrust
 Moderate frequency of
contacts, in
trusting atmosphere
Finances  Government funding, low
degree of financial autonomy
(e.g. no multi-annual
budgets, shifting budgets)
 Funding through tariffs and
fees, high degree of financial
autonomy (e.g. multi-annual
budgets, shifting budgets)
Involvement in policy development
(policy autonomy)




 High degree of involvement
in development of policy,
even initiating new policies
Legislation (legal basis, generic
legislation)
 Detailed legislation, both
generic and agency-specific
 Framework legislation, both
generic and agency-specific
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and specialized “line agencies” – all the other departments with portfolios
for policy, regulation and service delivery in specific policy sectors (e.g.
Department of Health, Department of Communication and the Arts, et
cetera).3 This use of the “agency” term, and a very small “executive agency”
uptake in the 1990s/early 2000s (as compared to the Next Steps program in
the UK), has led numerous commentators to argue that Australia has
focused more upon central coordination mega-departments and financial/
personal devolution to line managers rather than agencification4 (Halligan,
2000; Podger, 2016). But this ignores that much of the financial devolution
was equivalent to aspects of executive agency reforms elsewhere (such as
the Netherlands and the UK, Smullen, 2010) and that they often, certainly
most recently, went together with distinctive organizational identities, and
with legislative or regulatory mandates.
In the contemporary administrative landscape, both the Public
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act (PGPA, 2013) and the
Public Service Act (Public Service Act (PSA), 1999, amended in 2013
(Canberra) have been significant in distinguishing boundaries between dif-
ferent types of “entities”, their location within the core public service (or
not), and the rules, governance designs and values that apply to them (see
Podger, 2016 for a more detailed account). Key distinctions recognized in
the PGPA Act is that between Non-Commonwealth Corporate Entities
(NCCEs), Commonwealth Corporate Entities (CCEs), and Commonwealth
Companies (the latter is excluded from this analysis) (Smullen & Fawcett,
2018).5 Importantly, all government departments (thus central and line
agencies) come under the PGPA Act as NCCEs, but they also have other
NCCEs within their portfolio (and some that are not and thus part of the
department NCCE), for example the Aged Care & Safety Quality
Commission is an NCCE in the portfolio of the Department of Health,
while the Therapeutic Goods Administration is part of the Department of
Health, and not its own NCCE. This has the effect that NCCEs within a
Department’s portfolio have a separate organizational identity, but are still
legally and financially part of the Commonwealth (core of legal state).
More examples can be found on the Australian Commonwealth
Department of Finance website (https://www.finance.gov.au/resource-man-
agement/governance/#flipchart).
By contrast, CCEs also generally work within a department’s portfolio,
but have a separate legal personality from the Commonwealth (for example
to enter into contracts and own property). A number of contemporary
CCEs previously fell under the CAC Act 1997 and generally have a board,
with members appointed by the responsible portfolio minister. The PGPA
Act replaced both the FMA and CAC Acts and in the period leading to
that, many statutory authorities initially under the CAC 1997, particularly
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those dependent on significant government funding, were subjected to the
FMA or were privatized (Edwards et al., 2012).
According to most recent data (July, 2020), there are currently 98
NCCEs, 71 CCEs and 18 Commonwealth Companies – considered princi-
pal bodies of the Australian administrative state both within the APS and
the Commonwealth (Department of Finance, 2016). This appears as a rela-
tively lean state. Indeed, it was recently reported that the APS, i.e. those
employees falling under the Public Service Act, has shrunk to its smallest
size in 12 years (SMH, 2018). Austerity measures instigated from the mid-
2010s, and managed through the Department of Finance, did see rational-
ization of different entity types, this escalated with consolidations, mergers,
and terminations during the period 2013–2016 (Commonwealth of
Australia, 2014). However, the figures reported exclude employees for
non-APS bodies and the use of contracting private actors/firms. For the
purpose of this research, we classify as ALAs NCCEs other than ministerial
departments and CCEs; while statutory office holders were included in
the survey, they are not included in our analysis as ALAs, nor are
government companies.
Managing at arm’s length in Australia
In terms of describing the nature of the relationships between political and
bureaucratic masters and their “entities”, or rather ALAs in Australia, a
range of instruments have been introduced from performance measurement
to board design prescription and capability reviews with a long-term stra-
tegic objective. These include formal proclamations of shifting to “principle
based” management such as in Australia’s PGPA Act 2013. Podger (2016)
argues that many of these financial and management reform initiatives fol-
low a consistent trajectory, rather than U-turns, that in general reinforce
political priorities with devolved management authority, such as to
attain “results”.
Elsewhere, including in Podger’s scholarship, there is concern that this
has occurred alongside too much demand for “political responsiveness”
which potentially undermines devolved management (Aucoin, 2012; Maley,
2017). Politicization in Australia is argued to have occurred through minis-
ter’s appointing officials on partisan lines (such as departmental secretaries,
of chairs and members of agency boards, or heads of executive agencies),
also with the consequence and practice of reinforcing new lines of report-
ing directly from ALAs to ministers.6 For example, as opposed to, or as
well as through, the bureaucratic hierarchy with departments. Australian
Administrative Arrangement Orders (defining ministerial responsibilities)
distribute functions according to portfolios, with most ALAs within a
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portfolio directly responsible to their portfolio (assistant) minister.
Departments have coordination responsibilities for ALAs in their portfolio
remit, such as for budget and performance reporting. There is concern that
increasing politicization undermines recent objectives for agency managers
(and even departmental secretaries) to be long term strategic risk takers, as
opposed to being subject to political opportunism in a contested environ-
ment (also where ministers receive advise from their political advisors, see
also Maley, 2017).
Against the background of a suite of management reforms pertaining to
ALA’s in Australia, both with horizontal dimensions pertaining to devolu-
tion of management and shared values (stewardship), as well as hierarchical
dimensions with respect to (re)asserting political authority (principal-
agent), it is timely to evaluate the degree to which a stewardship model of
monitoring and management is perceived among ALAs.
Method and data
The data used in this paper originates from the Calibrating Public Sector
Accountability international survey which was administered online in the
period of November – mid December in 2017 to top management officials
within federal ALAs in Australia, (of NCCEs other than ministerial depart-
ments, CCEs and statutory office holders). The international survey focused
on top-level managers and staff in ALAs and their accountability toward
portfolio departments. The survey consisted of four parts with questions
focusing upon the accountability regime (such as reporting and monitoring
activities), institutional control variables such as size, type and task of the
agency, questions to assess the “felt accountability” of respondents, and
their managerial behavior. A number of features of the survey drew from
existing quantitative research and surveys of ALAs, in particular the
COBRA study (www.soc.kuleuven.be/io/cost). The Australian survey was
composed of 26 questions, including some information about
the respondent.
Response rate
The survey was sent out to 169 ALAs (excluding the departments) and
addressed to targeted respondents among the agency’s management team.
An email with a link to the online survey was generally sent to the CEO,
and although only one member of the executive team was asked to respond
the link could be forwarded within the organization. The survey was open
for 40 days and three email reminders were sent to respondents throughout
this period. Furthermore, a research assistant telephoned respondents to
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inform them of the survey and remind them of the deadline. Ultimately, 89
respondents filled out the questionnaire, which makes the response rate
52%. Most respondents were top managers, such as CEOs, chief finance
officers or other key executives. Having only one respondent per agency is
one of the limitations of the data: however, we assume that these respond-
ents are the best informed, given their top position, about the use of instru-
ments in the relationship between the agency and the portfolio department.
Asking more respondents from one and the same agency is no solution in
this case as the questions about instruments relate mostly to factual topics.
We do acknowledge however that the validity of our conclusions would be
served by doing more research, using other methods (like interviews) and
data sources. In a few instances we have complemented the survey data
with information from other sources (legislation, annual reports, websites),
for example on the policy sector, task and size in terms of personnel
and budget.
Operationalizations
For this paper, we make use of those questions in the survey that capture
the use of different instruments as discussed above, such as the use of audit
and monitoring, the presence of horizontal relationships, stakeholder
engagement, and quality of contacts with the portfolio department. Other
survey questions probed perceptions of the agency managers about their
relationships with departmental/political principals. The Supplementary
Appendix provides an overview of the questions and items that were used
in this article.
Sample representativeness
Four types of ALAs were included in the survey: 41 Non-Corporate
Commonwealth entities (NCCEs -executive arm’s length agencies), 43
Commonwealth Corporate Entities (CCEs, primarily statutory bodies) and
there were a small sample of Statutory Office Holders (independent legisla-
tive officers) and Commonwealth Companies in the study. The statutory
office holders and companies will not be included in our analyses below
because of their small number and some missing data, so total N¼ 84.
Compared to the population (based on publicly available documents),
the sample is representative in some aspects (e.g. type of body) but not in
all aspects. For example, the number of ALAs in the sample is in accord-
ance with the division in the population in most cases, but there are
slightly less ALAs in the sample than in the population in the fields of the
Prime Minister, Health and the Attorney General, while there is a slight
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overrepresentation in the fields of Employment, Infrastructure and Social
services (Table 2). The ALAs in the sample are also slightly younger and
larger in terms of personnel and budget. They also have on average a larger
board, who are also more often paid for their position (68 versus 56%, not
reported in the table). This could be interpreted as an indication that the
ALAs in the sample are a bit more professionalized (larger, more resources)
than the average body. However, the differences are not extreme and con-
cern small numbers, but should be taken into account nevertheless, when
interpreting the results from the analyses.
Table 3 presents the data for task. These results are based on researcher
(double) coding of the relevant population (of NCCEs and CCEs, excluding
statutory office holders and companies) that received the survey, and, the
sample of (relevant NCCE and CCE only) respondents. When coding for
task, only the primary task type was counted, though the agency may tra-
verse more than one category. Among agencies coded as policy task were
policy advisory bodies, for example about (expert) infrastructure or eco-
nomic issues. There were a number of agencies coded with regulatory or
payment tasks, although they also work in the intergovernmental sphere.
Within the category of Public/Professional services, there was a mix of out-
ward facing (professional) services to citizens or businesses, as well as
inward facing services to other agencies, such as digital or finan-
cial services.
Table 2. Composition and representativeness of sample of arm’s length agencies (N¼ 84).
Population Sample
Type of body
CCE 68 43 (¼63%)
NCCE 73 41 (¼56%)
Portfolio department
Agriculture and water resources 8 6
Attorney General 16 6
Communication and arts 13 8
Defense and Veteran Affairs 8 7
Education and Training 7 5
Employment 9 7
Environment and Energy 7 3
Finance 4 3
Foreign Affairs and Trade 4 1
Health 17 8
Human Services and Social Services 3 3
Industry Innovation and Science 7 4
Infrastructure and Regional Development 7 7
Prime Minister and Cabinet 15 5
Treasury 16 11
Average year of establishment 1989 1991
PS Act applicable 93 (no 49) 55 (no 27)
Average staff 564 730
Budget in m-dollars 282 406
Max. number of board members 7.7 8.4
Line departments, commonwealth companies, and statutory office holders are not included. NCCEs and CCEs
total N¼ 141 in this table (out of 169). Table is based on 2018 data.
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The (coded) results show the vast majority of ALAs in the sample are
charged with public services, regulatory services, financial transactions and
research. There appears to be some underrepresentation of ALAs with
research tasks and slight over representation of payment and tribunal enti-
ties compared to the population. Noteworthy, were important differences
between how the researchers coded agency tasks as compared to respond-
ent’s perceptions of their tasks. For example, policy tasks were rated much
higher among survey responses, and a large portion of respondents rated
their task using the option “other”, which was not found necessary with
researcher coding. Examples of tasks listed as “other” by respondents
included, among others, operating a museum, natural park conservation,
and investigation of complaints. Most of “other” responses in the survey
were recoded public services.
Data have been analyzed using SPSS 25. Most analyses are descriptive.
To test differences between types of ALAs, their tasks and portfolio depart-
ments we have used ANOVA. The numbers are however small for certain
variables, so the results should be interpreted with caution.
Results
This section presents the findings from the analyses on the different instru-
ments from Table 1 for CCEs and NCCEs, the two types of ALAs at federal
level that are included in our analysis Thereafter, the perception of the rela-
tionship by these ALAs is discussed. We only report statistically significant
findings when these have been found (this applies for example to task
effects, which are mostly absent).
Board
The majority (67.1%) of ALAs have a board. However, there is a statistic-
ally significant difference (F¼ 14.575, p<.000) between the different types
Table 3. Task of arm’s length agencies.
Task Population Sample
Public/Professional services 45 (31.9%) 23 (27.3%)
Supervision, regulation, control 34 (24.1%) 18 (21.4%)
Payment/collection money 18 (12.7%) 14 (16.6%)
Tribunal 8 (5.6%) 7 (8.3%)
Research 18 (12.7%) 11 (13.1%)
Information communication 2 (1.4%) 1 (1.2)
Policy task 11 (7.8%) 7 (8.3%)
Quality assessment 3 (2.1%) 2 (2.3%)
Intergovernmental relations 1 (0.7%) 0 (0%)
Registration 1 (0.7%) 1 (1.2%)
Total 141 84
N¼ 169 for the complete survey. We have excluded statutory officeholders and Commonwealth Companies in
the above table.
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of bodies: almost all CCEs (36 out of 39, 92.3%) have a board, while less
than half of the NCCEs do (19 out of 43, 44.2%). The CCE boards are on
average much larger (12.7 members) than the NCCE boards (4.5 members).
CCE board members also get paid more often (81.7%) than NCCE board
members (51.2%). CCE respondents indicate that they meet between 6 and
11 times a year with their board.
There are also some small differences between ALAs with certain tasks:
ALAs with public service or policy tasks almost always have a board, while
tribunals never have a board. Boards have been established most frequently
in the policy fields of Communication, Defense and Infrastructure, regard-
less of the type of agency. These differences concern small numbers of
ALAs though and should not be overgeneralized.
The presence of agency boards has a long history in Australia but they
have been most common for statutory authorities and companies (Smullen
& Clutton, 2020), which were later most likely to be defined as CCEs or
Commonwealth companies (enterprises) under the PGPA Act.
Appointments to boards are generally made by responsible ministers,
although specific legislation for a given agency or task may specify appoint-
ment of particular types of experts or by other actors such as state jurisdic-
tions (see Edwards et al., 2012 p. 131). In general, NCCEs have only
advisory boards.
The omnipresence and larger size of the boards in CCEs seems to sug-
gest a more PS type of relationship for this type of body than is the case
for NCCEs.
Financial instruments
Table 4 shows the funding sources for the two types of ALAs. NCCEs are
very reliant on budgets that come directly from the government while most
CCEs have combinations of funding sources, including own income sour-
ces. The average budget of NCCEs is much lower than that of CCEs:
expenses by the department are on average 192.4m (AU$) dollars for
NCCEs, 681.7m (AU$) dollars for CCEs.7
Table 4. Funding of arm’s length agencies at federal level (N¼ 82).
CCE NCCE
No. % No. %
Annual budget allocated by the government 5 12.8 20 46.5
Other sources of income 8 20.5 2 4.7
Tariffs paid by users 3 7.7 3 7
Multi-annual budget allocated by the government 2 5.1 2 4.7
Combination of funding sources 21 53.8 16 37.2
Total 39 100 43 100
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NCCEs also have lower degrees of financial autonomy (Table 5): most
cannot take out loans, create legal entities and shift budgets. When we
aggregate the 5 items used to measure financial autonomy into one index
score (ranging from 0 no autonomy to 10 full autonomy on all items), the
average score for the whole sample is low at 4.68, although CCEs have a
significantly (F¼ 28.864, p<.000) higher average score (5.9) than NCCEs
(3.6). About 49% of CCEs score 6 or higher, while only 4.6% of NCCEs
achieve such a positive score. These numbers hold regardless of which
portfolio department an agency belongs to, or which task it has.
These findings indicate a rather tight financial hold upon ALAs, particu-
larly NCCEs but also in half of the CCEs. This is more congruent with a
PA approach than stewardship.
Legislation
Generic legislation concerns the PSA and PGPA acts, as explained above.
Significantly, commentary preceding both acts highlighted their “principle
based” features meant to codify standards within a more devolved and flex-
ible environment. This is frequently contrasted with earlier “compliance-
based” legislation and would suggest formal exoneration of a stewardship
role for agency officials. However, provisions, directions and operations
relating to both pieces of legislation still host compliance-based practices
(Alexander & Thodey, 2018; Maley, 2018).
In theory, the PGPA Act applies to all NCCEs and CCEs. It replaced the
former FMA Act 1997 and CAC Act 1997, identifying types of entities in a
slightly different way than before and under a single integrated framework.
Among the objectives for this integration of different entities under one act
was accommodation of diverse organizational structures with shared gov-
ernance and accountability principles. PGPA allows entities discretion to
adopt “fit for purpose” management systems, while recognizing all affected
entities, irrespective of type or form, manage public resources and should
operate as part of a coherent whole.
Initially PGPA architects envisioned a system of “earned autonomy”
whereby the Minister of Finance approves different or relaxed governance
Table 5. Financial autonomy of arm’s length agencies at federal level (N¼ 82).
CCE NCC
Yes If No Yes If No
Take loans 9 9 21 0 5 38
Set fees 28 4 7 13 13 17
Create legal entities 7 15 17 2 3 38
Shift personnel and running budgets 29 6 4 34 3 6
Shift budgets over time 15 20 4 1 30 12
If: only after approval of the portfolio department.
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provisions depending on entity risk profile and performance (Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia 2013). Key provisions of the PGPA that
furnish a principle based approach include recognition of an “accountable
authority” with a uniform set of duties wherein the accountable authority
(either CEO or board) has discretion to design how these duties will be
achieved by the entity. For example, among prescribed duties are “establish
and maintain an appropriate system of risk oversight and management for
the entity” or the “duty to encourage cooperation with others”. Any discre-
tionary innovation of duties occurs within established protocols and time-
frames for budget statements, corporate plans, and annual reports.
A recent review of the PGPA reveals that compliance-based orientations
have not been dismantled though (Alexander & Thodey, 2018). It found
variation with respect to entities” engagement with risk management and
that (discretionary) development and tracking of performance regimes was
wanting. Smaller agencies found prescriptions in the PGPA such as require-
ments around audit committees particularly cumbersome, while CCEs gen-
erally exhibited better risk practices than NCCEs. Another important
finding of the review was that the risk appetite of ministers and parliament
had to date not led them to support ALAs in a stewardship role, and there
was a recommendation to strengthen the role of the Secretaries’ board to
drive improvements in operationalizing the PGPA.
According to the respondents the PSA applies to almost all NCCEs, but
only to 38% of CCEs; this difference is statistically significant (p<.000).
There are no differences with regard to task or portfolio department
though. This shows that the PSA Act is of primary relevance to NCCEs,
although some NCCEs fall outside of this legislation. In general the govern-
ment has sought to bring more NCCEs (and sometimes then changed the
status of CCEs into NCCEs, for example regulatory ALAs with coercive
powers) under the PSA Act because it sets out APS values and a code of
conduct (Podger, 2016). There has been some debate about the values
introduced in the 1999 PSA Act as it included “responsiveness” to the
elected government and achieving results for management performance,
alongside Westminster principles such as nonpartizanship, impartial, and
merit. The Act was amended in 2013 and the term “responsive” was
removed from legislation. Impartial and Committed to Service were now
identified as values pertaining to entities’ relations with ministers, although
responsive remains in the Australian Public Service Commissioner’s direc-
tions about the APS values (Maley, 2018). A key concern and discussion
around these changes included greater attention for the stewardship of the
public service and specifically the Departmental secretary as a steward pro-
tecting the long-term capability of the APS.
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Many entities, particularly CCEs, but increasingly NCCEs also, have their
own formation statutes or statutes that they may administer in a given pol-
icy or regulatory field. In general, this agency-specific legislation can pro-
tect and enable its policy autonomy, for example a regulator by giving
them enforcement powers or other legislative authority.
In sum, despite formal legal efforts to promote a stewardship role for
ALAs through the principle based (stewardship) PGPA and PSA, which
have been ambiguous, a compliance-oriented relationship with government
(principal-agent) is still apparent. This compliance orientation is more
apparent among NCCEs than CCEs.
Performance management
Unfortunately, the survey included only two items related to performance
management, so more research is necessary here, such as analysis of con-
tracts and annual reports. The two items asked respondents whether they
should meet measurable quality and performance targets and whether it is
important that they comply with legal norms (agreement measured on a 7-
point Likert scale). In both instances, large majorities of respondents
(>95%) agreed or strongly agreed with these propositions. This did not dif-
fer between different types of agency, nor their task and portfolio depart-
ments. The high level of agreement suggests that most ALAs’ opinion on
the importance of their performance is in line with the preferences of the
principal and thus suggests a stewardship approach by the ALAs – even
though both measurability and compliance are both more PA-instruments.
Involvement in policy development
There are not many clear patterns regarding the policy autonomy of ALAs.
Overall, there appears to be a relatively large degree of autonomy. There
are no differences between categories of ALAs based on task, portfolio
department, or type.
Based on the five items in Table 6 we have created an index score (rang-
ing from 0 no autonomy to 10 full autonomy on all items). The average
score is 6.4 (s.d. 1.44). Again, there are no statistically significant differen-
ces between types of ALAs, portfolio departments, and tasks. This implies
that most ALAs have a moderate degree of policy autonomy, and can take
decisions on goals, target groups and policy instruments. In case of deci-
sions about communication and priorities the degree of autonomy is even
higher. These findings are more in line with a stewardship model than a
principal-agent relationship.
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Contacts
In response to questions about the frequency of meetings between the port-
folio department and ALAs, we found that most meetings occur 2–5 times
per year. Table 7. This frequency applies to contacts with the minister and
the department (i.e. civil servants), formally and informally.
Most respondents meet with the department or the minister 2–5 times a
year, while other frequencies (once a week, once a year, never) are all
reported by about 10% of the respondents. These findings indicate that a
reasonable frequency of contact is maintained with most ALAs. Meetings
with boards are very common and frequent provided a board is present.
As we do not have information about the content of the interactions
with ministers and departments, it is difficult to say whether there is a PA
or a PS type of relationship. Interestingly, a large number (59.8%) of
respondents reports that there is a designated unit for contacts between
ALAs and their departments, at both ends – which would be in line with a
stewardship approach. However, 18.5% respondents state that neither
agency nor department had such a unit, so it is not a standard practice yet.
Monitoring
Survey questions about (1) the frequency of periodic reports to the minister
and/or portfolio department, (2) external audits and (3) formal evaluations
were used to gauge level of monitoring. Higher levels of monitoring, from
Table 6. Policy autonomy of arm’s length agencies at federal level (N¼ 82).
CCE NCC
Who decides on … Self Input Other Self Input Other
Overall goals 12 25 1 20 22 1
Identification target groups 23 14 0 20 20 1
Choice policy instruments 21 16 1 18 23 1
Public communication 25 12 0 29 13 0
Prioritization of tasks 24 13 1 29 13 1
With input from other stakeholders.
Note that not all items were applicable to all arm’s length agencies.
Table 7. Contacts between arm’s length agencies and portfolio department, minister and
agency board (N¼ 82).
Department Minister Board
No. % No. % No. %
Does not apply 3 3.7 4 4.9 16 19.5
Never 4 4.9 4 4.9 0 0
Once every few years 0 0 2 2.4 0 0
Once a year 4 4.9 9 11.0 1 1.2
2–5 times a year 37 45.1 43 52.4 16 19.5
6–11 times a year 16 19.5 7 8.5 22 26.8
Every month 9 11.0 8 9.8 15 18.3
Every week 9 11.0 5 6.1 12 14.6
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6 to 11 times per year and more, indicate a strong principal-agent ethos in
the relationship. Figure 1 shows the degree of monitoring.
Submitting periodic reports to the minister or portfolio department is
quite common, indicating a moderate to high degree of monitoring.
Evaluations and audits are carried out less often: evaluations are mostly
done once a year, audits even less as one third of the ALAs reports that
this never occurs. This is perhaps not surprising since the latter forms of
monitoring are more extensive, but arguably more qualitative, with greater
potential for stewardship qualities of building cultural capacity and focus
on higher level organizational and policy goals. Furthermore, although cap-
ability reviews of ALAs were introduced in 2011, their use has been quanti-
tatively limited and stalled for a period. Although capability reviews are to
recommence, their limited uptake to date would indicate limited steward-
ship qualities in the relationship.
When we add up the three instruments, we see that most ALAs are con-
fronted with a low to moderate degree of monitoring overall. There is also
other evidence to indicate that ALAs have extensive input in defining their
own performance reporting measures, though sometimes within a (often
ambiguous) political strategy set by departments/government (cf. Alexander
& Thodey, 2018). Without full knowledge of the level of detail of these
types of monitoring it is difficult to say whether this points more to a prin-
cipal-agent or stewardship model of relationships. However, the types of
monitoring most commonly to occur appear to focus more upon time-lim-
ited performance measures as opposed to building long term strategic cap-
acity. This observation would need to be further examined through more









never low moderate high intense
reports evaluaons audits total
Figure 1. Degree of monitoring of federal arm’s length agencies by ministers/ministries
(N¼ 89). Low: once every year/every few years, Moderate: 2–5 times a year, High: 6–11 times a
year or every month, Intense: every week/every day
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Horizontal accountability
Some ALAs indicated to report to “other stakeholders” (17 out of 89).
When asked about these stakeholders, they mention the Australian
National Audit Office most, and sometimes parliamentary or intergovern-
mental committees and independent review bodies. Industry and businesses
or clients are mentioned three times. Only these latter stakeholders could
be seen as a form of horizontal accountability, so overall the ALAs do not
seem to engage much in it. However, when confronted with propositions
about this topic, the majority (over 80%) of the ALAs agrees that (1) per-
formance information should be publicly available to all stakeholders and
(2) that the agency should regularly meet with stakeholders from civil soci-
ety on a strategic level. This suggest that ALAs may want to engage in hori-
zontal accountability (fitting with a stewardship approach), but in fact do
not do so through reports and evaluations. There is evidence (in annual
reports) that stakeholder engagement and consultation occurs but perhaps
ALAs do not conceive of this as a form of accountability.
Relationship between agency and minister/department
A number of propositions was used to ask respondents about their rela-
tionship with the minister and/or portfolio department.8 Figure 2 presents
the results, in which we have merged the original 7 point Likert scale to a
3 point scale: (strongly/somewhat) disagree, neutral, (strongly/some-
what) agree.
Overall, ALAs seem pleased with the feedback they get when they send in
information or account for their performance, either to the minister or the
department. However, ALAs also agree in large numbers to propositions
that seem to express a lack of attention or memory on the side of the min-
ister (“we often have to explain why we do certain things”) and that point
to an uneven distribution of power, with the minister/department clearly
having the upper hand in the relationship (“when the minister/department
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
The porolio department provides construcve feedback on our work
When the porolio department changes its views we just have to comply with this new reality
It is a good thing that we are ulmately accountable to the porolio department
Opinions from the porolio department are generally unambiguous
The porolio department thoroughly reads the reports that we send to it
The responsible Minister - We oen have to explain why we do certain things
The responsible Minister provides construcve feedback on our work
When the reponsible minister changes its views we just have to comply with this new reality
It is a good thing that we are ulmately accountable to the responsible minister
Opinions from the responsible minister are generally unambiguous
The responsible minister thoroughly reads the reports that we send them
disagree neutral agree
Figure 2. Propositions about the relationship between federal arm’s length agencies and the
minister/portfolio department (N¼ 82).
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changes its mind, we have to accept the new reality”). This is a generic pic-
ture; there are no statistically significant differences between types of ALAs,
their task or the portfolio department with which they are dealing. In an
increasingly adversarial political context where top-level administrative offi-
cials can and are changed with a change of government, it does not how-
ever bode well for a long-term steward relationship and even may point to
dysfunctional relationships.
When asked about the skills of the minister/department in monitoring
ALAs, the respondents indicate that these are generally good. For example,
they agree that the ALAs are generally being held accountable by clear and
understandable indicators. However, the ALAs’ respondents are less convinced
that the minister/department have the substantive expertise needed to be able
to evaluate the agency (see Figure 3). This is in line with the assumed infor-
mation asymmetry between principals and agents or stewards, and therefore
in itself does not point to either of the two models being applicable here.
Goal convergence
The most important difference between a principal-agent and principal-stew-
ard approach concerns the assumption of goal divergence or congruence. The
survey contained two items on this topic, which render interesting results.
Respondents were asked to respond on a 7-point Likert scale (from strongly
disagree to strongly agree) whether they are willing to work in the interest of
(i) the portfolio department and (ii) the minister. The majority of all
respondents agree with this proposition (87.8% agrees on the first, and 96.0%
on the second proposition) regardless of type of ALA and task. And although
not statistically significant, the NCCEs are on average more negative about
most propositions than the CCEs. This is an interesting finding since NCCEs
in general are more likely to be subject to the Public Service Act (1999,
amended in 2013) and are therefore part of the core of the APS. In both a
legal and financial sense, NCCEs can be vulnerable to (potentially
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
The porolio department holds me accountable for all of my decisions
The porolio department applies clear/understandable standards to evaluate our most
important task
The porolio department has sufficient substanve or technical experse about our work
to oversee /evaluate our dues
I am held very accountable by the porolio department for our most important task
The reponsible Minister holds me accountable for all of my decisions
The responsible Minister applies clear/understandable standards to evaluate our most
important task
The responsible Minister has sufficient substanve or technical experse about our work to
oversee /evaluate our dues
I am held very accountable by the responsible Minister for our most important task
disagree neutral agree
Figure 3. Propositions about the capacity and skills of the minister and department to monitor
arm’s length agencies at federal level (N¼ 82).
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unexpected) political demands of the minister and government, in spite of
any agreed performance measures although their employees are more likely
to be permanent public servants and instilled with values of merit and expert-
ise. While such unexpected political disruptions can also occur with CCEs,
their more extensive (legal and financial) autonomy can shield against this or
indeed be deemed consistent with a potentially “politically appointed” board.
All in all, these findings seem to suggest that most ALAs perceive them-
selves more as a steward than an agent, but CCEs more often than NCCEs.
Discussion and conclusions
Table 8 summarizes the findings. It is important to recognize that our find-
ings are drawn primarily from the survey responses. More research with
other sources of data and methods is necessary to further substantiate our
conclusions.
In general, the type of instruments examined and how they are deployed
appear to favor more a principal-agent model of monitoring, and this is
most strongly experienced by NCCEs (see e.g. their low degree of financial
autonomy) as compared to CCEs. These are tentative findings and lend
greater weight to the features of some of the instruments, for example, the
tight financial controls of NCCEs, the limited number of NCCE boards
and (bespoke) political appointments to CCE boards, the limited use of
audit, evaluation, capability reviews (according to respondents) as com-
pared to the frequency of performance reporting.
Nevertheless, there are also indications of stewardship features to the
relationships and the potential for this kind of arrangement. For example,
the majority of respondents, whether NCCE or CCE, indicate a moderate
(and arguably good level of) frequency of contact and a moderate degree of
policy autonomy. Furthermore, ALAs generally have input to and even
design their performance reporting requirements and plans, and the generic
legislative frameworks (PGPA) commit to a principle based governance.
The practice of these latter arrangements still requires further empirical
examination, as do the designated units for contacts.
Most ALAs perceive the relationship with the portfolio department and
minister in a positive way, but also report a lack of interest or attention as
well as a lack of capability to process all information provided. This fits
with the information asymmetry that is characteristic for the principal-
agent/steward relation. Therefore, in itself this does not say much about
the perceived quality of the relationship; that would require more research.
In sum, we find that there is not one of the two models in use, rather a
mixture of instruments and features from both. While ALAs seem more
inclined to embody a stewardship approach (see the findings on goal
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congruence), the Australian federal government mixes elements and instru-
ments from the two approaches, despite the intended shift to stewardship
entombed in the PGPA Act. These findings offer more support for the idea
of a continuum between both models rather than a dichotomy. Similar find-
ings have been reported for other countries (Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2019;
Van Thiel et al., 2018, but see Bjurstøm, 2020). Although the number of
studies is still small, further theory development is necessary to determine
whether there are any typical mixes, under which conditions these are devel-
oped and used, and how they are affected over time and by multiple interac-
tions between ALAs and governmental principals (cf. Grundei, 2008).
Table 8. Summary of findings.
Instrument Findings
Are findings more in line with PA
or PS?
Board Minority of NCCEs have boards
compared to almost all CCEs. CCE
boards are larger, and have more
often paid members.
CCE boards generally have legal
competencies and expert
appointments, they appoint the
agency CEO. Appointment of
board members are mostly done
by the minister. Recently there is
increasing evidence that CCE
board appointments are becoming
politicized.
PA for NCCEs and PS for CCEs,
although recent evidence of
politicized board appointments
points to increasing PA for CCEs
Monitoring/Accountability Moderate degree of monitoring for
NCCEs and CCEs but primarily
routinized financial and
performance reporting (input/
output orientation not examined).
Limited use of evaluation, audits and
capability reviews for NCCEs
and CCEs.
More PA than PS
Performance management Almost all ALAs agree on importance
of measurability and compliance.
PA instrument (but small
evidence base)
Contacts Majority of respondents meet once
per month or every two months
with portfolio department or
minister. Almost 60% report
having a designated unit for
departments and ALAs. No pattern
in frequency of contacts on basis
of agency type or other variables.
Moderate frequency of contacts.
Because of lack of information
on content of contacts no
conclusion on PA/PS.
Finances NCCEs are more reliant on direct
government funding than CCEs.
NCCEs also have lower degree of
financial autonomy.
Budget size does not affect
other variables.
PA for NCCEs, PS for CCEs
Involvement in policy
development
Moderate degree of policy autonomy
for all ALAs, no clear patterns for
task, legal type or
portfolio department.
PS
Legislation PGPA Act and PSA Act seek to
provide generic and value/principle
based framework legislation.
PGPA aims for PS relationships
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Furthermore, following the claim by Davis et al. (1997) the mixing of
instruments would be expected to lead to dysfunctional relationships. Our
findings on how ALAs perceive the parent minister and portfolio depart-
ment seems to suggest an overall positive relationship, but with some
points for concern such as the level of attention and the capacity of the
responsible minister and department. This could be interpreted as indica-
tive of some problems, but more qualitative studies are needed to reveal
whether there are indeed dysfunctional relationships.
Finally, some limitations of our research and recommendations for future
research need to be mentioned. The survey contained limited information
about some of the instruments, such as the use of performance measure-
ment; this could be complemented by an analysis of the formal account-
ability arrangements such as annual reports and accounts. More qualitative
research would be needed to go into the results regarding policy autonomy,
boards and the content of contacts between ministries and ALAs. Also, it
would be good to survey the portfolio departments as well, to get data
from their side of the relationship. Replication of this study in other coun-
tries and/or in Australian states would also be called for. While the findings
on federal ALAs in Australia resonate with findings in other countries, the
number of countries under study is still very small. Agencification has
however occurred all over the world, making research into the relationship
between governments and agencies a topic of global interest.
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Notes
1. Here the term “principal” has nothing to do with principal-agent theory – it is how
the Department of Finance describes the main type of administrative bodies of the
APS and Commonwealth.
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2. This distinction also indicates that not all ministers are entirely equal in cabinet
decision-making processes with ministers of DPM&C and Treasury seen as holding
greater authority/sway over others. Though this does not prevent other ministers from
fighting for the departmental turf or being more in tune with the details of their
departments and portfolio of responsibilities.
3. The entrenched application of this use of agency (as departments) in Australia, and
other arcane distinctions, led Professor Roger Wettenhall to prefer the term Non
Departmental Public Bodies but there are a number of different types and legal/
financial/normative requirement boundaries that these traverse, and some are arguably
equivalent to executive agency/other comparative distinctions (Podger 2016; Smullen
2010; Van Thiel 2012).
4. Perhaps a more accurate description of these commentators argument, which they
have also espoused, is that Australia has not per se embraced a commitment to
separating policy from implementation, where ALAs simply deliver services. Public
bodies, including core departments, have been seen as integral to contributing to both
policy and implementation. The cumulative trajectories of organizational reforms
affecting Centrelink is illustrative of this.
5. We exclude Commonwealth Companies, often referred to as Government Business
Enterprises (GBEs), which are companies the Commonwealth controls, such as the
Australian Railway Track Corporation. The PGPA describes relevant companies, but
they are also governed by a separate Act, the Corporations Act. There are currently 18
Commonwealth Companies.
6. Direct relationships between CCE Chairs and/or boards, or rather what were formally
statutory authorities or corporations, with ministers has a longer precedent. With the
insertion of ‘executive agency’ into the PSA Act direct reporting between the agency CEO
and minister, then for ALAs with less formal independence (eg. NCCEs) was routinized.
7. Budget numbers are based on annual accounts. We have not included the Treasury
and the Tax Office (outliers).
8. The Australian survey was distinguished among the other seven countries surveyed in
the Calibrating Public Sector Accountability study in that survey questions posed
about relationships, contacts and reporting to a political/bureaucratic ‘principal’ asked
respondents to distinguish and rate their experiences between reporting to their
department and reporting to their minister.
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